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Critical infrastructures such as electricity networks, drinking water provision and transport 
infrastructures play an essential role in the functioning of our society. Flood events may, 
however, have significant impacts on critical infrastructure leading to adverse consequences for 
the society also far beyond the flooded regions. In order to better support the preparedness and 
response of responsible authorities, the Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience 
Research Network (CIPRNet) aims at developing a decision support system for critical 
infrastructure operators and authorities. This paper points out the importance of critical 
infrastructure using the example of flood events and shows the first steps of CIPRNet towards a 
decision support system for consequence analysis of critical infrastructure disruptions.  
 
IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN FLOOD EVENTS 
 
Critical infrastructure (CI) can be defined as “an asset, system or part thereof […] which is 
essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or 
social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant 
impact […] as a result of the failure to maintain those functions” [1]. 
Thus, CI such as electricity or communication networks, drinking water provision or 
transport infrastructure, play an essential role in the proper functioning of our society and the 
economy. Flood events, however, may have significant impacts on CI, possibly leading to 
adverse consequences for society and economy also far beyond the flooded regions. 
The European flooding of the Danube and Elbe rivers in summer 2013 caused direct 
economic damages in the order of 16 billion US$ in central Europe [2]. Moreover, CI such as 
electricity networks, railways lines, highways and communication networks have been 
considerably affected by flooding, leading to significant adverse impacts for the society and the 
economy in Central Europe. For example, the damage of a single bridge of a high-speed railway 
line in Germany led to major delays and cancellations within the Trans-European high-speed 
rail network for more than six months.  
The course of the flood event and related emergency response actions exposed flaws in 
preparedness and the understanding of emergency responders of the need to protect CI. For 
instance, water level gauges failed, flood models flawed for the extreme amounts of water, 
emergency call numbers became timely unreachable, while in some areas first responders could 
not communicate due to failure of radio networks. As a consequence, protection and evacuation 
measures could not be carried out properly.  
This paper will point out the importance of CI and related direct/indirect consequences 
with respect to flood events. A fictitious cross-boundary flooding scenario at the German-Dutch 
border along the River Rhine will be used to illustrate possible cascading effects caused by the 
failure of CI. The goals of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience Research 
Network (CIPRNet) will be presented, and the first steps within the CIPRNet towards a 
decision support system for consequences analysis of critical infrastructure will be explained.  
 
GOALS OF CIPRNET  
 
CIPRNet is a Network of Excellence in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) for research and 
development for a wide range of stakeholders including (multi)national emergency authorities, 
CI operators, policy makers, and the society. It is expected that CIPRNet will enhance the 
resilience of CI in Europe by improving the knowledge and understanding, preparation and 
mitigation of CI disruptions and their consequences. 
As part of the joint research, a decision support system (DSS) is being developed for 
(multi)national emergency management authorities and CI owners. The DSS capabilities 
provide timely, actionable, risk-informed CIP analyses and strategies that support the 
preparation for, response to, and recovery from possible CI disruptions. For further information 
about CIPRNet it is referred to the project website www.ciprnet.eu. 
Figure 1 shows the overall workflow and the different architectural components of the 
CIPRNet DSS. Hereby, CI simulators are linked with simulators of so-called external threats. It 
can be seen that different threats, such as floods, earthquakes or landslides, will be considered 
by analyzing historical data, forecasts and real time information.  
 
TOWARDS A DECISION SUPPORT TOOL 
 
The main objective of the CIPRNet DSS is to analyze possible critical scenarios from the 
prediction of the initial events (such as rainfall and related flooding) to the assessment of the 
impacts on CI networks and the consequences of the reduction or loss of CI networks Quality of 
Service (QoS) on the population, economy and industrial sectors. The structured workflow 
implemented by the DSS is composed of five functional blocks (Figure 1): 
B1. Monitoring of natural phenomena 
B2. Prediction of natural disasters and events detection 
B3. Prediction of physical damage scenarios 
B4. Estimation of impacts and consequences 
B5. Design of efficient strategies to cope with crisis scenarios 
 
The general workflow will be customized in order to reflect the needs of the different 
European state members and state members’ CI. Consequently, the DSS workflow and reports 
need to be interlinked with the existing crisis management chain of command for decision 
making. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall CIPRNet workflow for the development of the DSS capability [3] 
 
Risk Assessment Loop 
The functional blocks B1-B5 form the Risk Assessment Loop (RAL) that aims to link 
quantitatively and qualitatively the risk R(Ti,CIj
x
), expressed by the probability of a given threat 
to the consequences that its manifestations might have on CI elements. The theoretical 
framework of the RAL can be expressed as the risk associated to the lost (or the functionality 
reduction) of the element CIj
x
 (x
th
 element of the j
th
 infrastructure) due to a natural threat [4]: 
 
( , ) Pr( ) ( , ) ( )x x xi j i j i jR T CI T V CI T I CI ,     (1)  
 
where: 
 Pr(Ti) is the probability of occurrence of the threat Ti, 
 V(CIj
x
,Ti) is the vulnerability of the j
th
 component of the x
th
 CI with respect to the 
threat Ti, 
 I(CIj
x
) is the sum of the impacts that the absence of the j
th
 CI component produces 
upon failure in its network and in the other CI networks which are functionally 
related to it. 
The RAL workflow can be summarized using the following algorithmic steps:  
1. Compute the Initial Physical Harms Scenario: the DSS, using models to predict 
extreme natural events and CIPRNet vulnerability data, computes the CI 
components that may be considered in failure in the next hours. 
2. Compute the Expected Damage Scenario: the DSS communicates the Initial 
Physical Harms Scenario to the involved CI operators using the Collaborative 
Platform of Figure 1. The DSS waits the reply of CI operators consisting of the 
expected reduction of QoS of their network. The DSS runs an Interdependency 
Simulator to evaluate possible failure cascading effects of the CI networks 
reduction of QoS. 
3. Evaluate the consequences: the DSS runs the consequence analysis models to 
evaluate the consequence on population, environment, economic and industrial 
sectors of the Expected Damage Scenario. The consequences analysis models will 
rely on previous CIPRNet partners experiences as for example the work [5] for 
environmental consequences and [6] for consequences on society. Other models 
will be developed within the CIPRNet projects. 
4. Write and send DSS reports: The DSS reports may contain information about 
multiple expected CI crisis scenarios as for example risk assessment and 
consequence analysis of the most probable CI crisis scenario and the worst CI 
crisis scenario. 
 
The DSS outputs are structured reports containing risk assessment information and 
consequence analysis results. At the same time, the crisis management decision makers will be 
supported by a graphical user interface showing the same information contained in the DSS 
report. The display of the DSS is based on geographical maps, as different geo-referenced 
layers will allow the decision makers to have an instantaneous overall picture of the expected 
crisis scenario and its consequences. 
 
CROSS-BOUNDARY FLOODING SCENARIO 
 
In the following sections a possible flood event along the German-Dutch border is briefly 
described. The storyline will serve as a basis for the what-if analysis in CIPRNet and later on 
for the development of the DSS.  
In order to demonstrate possible impacts from flooding on CI, the focus is set on the 
temporal development and specific properties of the threat. In case of a flood situation along the 
River Rhine, emergency managers have different options to manage the flood, for instance one 
dike ring can be flooded to prevent dike breaches further downstream. Hereby it is important to 
emphasize that most of the actions and decisions taken by responsible authorities are strongly 
dependent on the water levels observed or predicted along the main rivers. 
The goal of the flood scenario is to find out the direct impacts of a flood and the indirect 
effects are through so-called cascading effects. These cascading effects are not always known 
beforehand. However, from other research projects such as FloodProBE [7] it was concluded 
that the electricity network and its nodes is the most important one of all the CI-networks, as 
most other CI are dependent on the electricity network and as it is vulnerable to many threats. 
The Dutch Quick-Scan analysis on CI [8], however, placed the water management CI (e.g. 
dikes, pumps, locks) at the top, followed by electrical power at number two. 
Thus, different models, data and analyses are assimilated to show these cascading effects 
and their influence within the flooded area and beyond.  
 
Storyline  
A storyline scenario has been worked out for the areas along the River Rhine at the Dutch-
German border area. The residential areas are protected from flooding by large dike rings (cf. 
Figure 3). In this scenario, due to a long period of rainfall in the Rhine basin and consequently 
high water levels along the rivers, the situation is critical along parts of the river banks. Water 
levels that occur every 1000 years are expected, which would be higher than ever measured.  
Possible impacts on CI are analyzed by means of flood scenarios, which have been 
generated for different dike breach locations by responsible water boards. As part of the 
scenario, a possible dike breach along the Rhine near the Dutch-German border is assumed. In 
case of an actual failure this would lead to a large-scale flood with water levels up to 7.5 m in 
some areas (cf. Figure 3), resulting in about 750 victims without evacuation and approximately 
8.8 billion Euro of economic losses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Possible flooding of dike ring 48 in case of a dike breach near the Dutch-German 
border, based on data from the water boards and ArcGIS (background map) 
 
Within the storyline, possible cascading effects due to potential flood events for power 
grids, telecommunications and drinking water infrastructure, logistics and transport are 
analyzed. It is assumed that preparations are taken for large-scale evacuations. 
The high water situation will further progress through the Rhine from Dutch-German 
border. The storyline indicates five possible ‘first’ events that could trigger cascading effects to 
other CI networks:  
 Day 1: A small dike breach in Germany will cause problems around the city of 
Emmerich, leading to an increased alertness of the emergency authorities. 
 Day 2: Caused by the saturation of a combined embankment (rail, road), a landslide 
will damage electricity cables and drinking water pipelines. 
 Day 3: An incident around one of a traffic tunnel causes the disruption of both road 
and train connections between The Netherlands and Germany. 
 Day 4: A dike breach near Rees will cause major floods in dike ring 48. 
 Day 5: One of the main bridges downstream the River Rhine is considered to be 
instable and is therefore forced to shut down. This will lead to complicated evacuation 
and rescue operations. 
 
As a first step of the what-if analysis based on the storyline, available information on CI in 
the study area has been collected. The focus has been set on spatial information (GIS data) and 
detailed information about the CI networks in the study area.  
A quick scan of the GIS data has shown that such a flood event and related “first” events as 
described in the storyline could have major impact in CI. Beside the interruption of nearly all 
major roads and railways, the flood would also significantly affect the power network (cf. 
Figure 4) as eight power distribution stations in the flooded area are located in the flood extent. 
Their cut-off would not only mean the loss of energy distribution services within the dike ring, 
but potentially also outside the flooded area. Thus, in the subsequent analysis of CIPRNet a 
detailed analysis and modeling of CI networks has to be carried out.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Identified CI networks to be affected in the storyline flood scenario: international 
highways (left), railway network (center) and power network (right), based on data from the 
water boards, OpenStreetMap and ArcGIS (background map) 
 
Possible Implementation of the DSS 
In the cross-boundary flood scenario, the DSS external sources of data (B1) may be represented 
by the water level sensor monitoring network maintained by a Dutch Water Boards and the 
meteorological forecast data. If possible, these data will be stored within the CIPRNet database 
to build historical data series that can be used to perform post events analysis and to develop 
realistic scenario for what-if analysis. The DSS RAL workflow may operate in different states:  
1. Cold phase or normal condition (in the next future no CI failures are predicted). 
2. Alert state (in the next future CI failures are predicted with high confidence level and 
the impacts and consequences are not negligible). 
3. Hot phase (the DSS workflow is activated in order to evaluate the impacts and 
consequences of CI failures).   
 In the following a possible scenario is described to better understand the DSS sequence of 
operations and actions that can be performed in the cross-boundary flooding scenario for 
different operational states:  
Cold phase (2 days before the event): As no CI failure has been predicted, the DSS 
executes the normal workflow: B1a) get meteorological data at a prefixed schedule time and 
extrapolate rain precipitation forecast data B1b) get pluviometric sensor data and, B1c) get dike 
water levels; B2a) get forecast data, B2b) run landslide forecast models and B2c) run other 
natural hazards forecast models. The output of B2, for each CI components of the area 
considered by the DSS, is represented by the so called Threat Strength Matrix where the rows 
refer to the type of threat’s manifestation. The columns will indicate the severity of the threats. 
For each threat, its severity or intensity will be expressed using a grade scale [1-5]. After the 
computation of the Threat Strength matrix, the DSS proceeds with B3a. The vulnerability data 
are stored within the CIPRNet DB as a Vulnerability Matrix whose entries will be related to the 
maximum extent (strength) the element can stand without being structurally (and thus 
functionally) perturbed. Using the Threat Strength Matrix and the Vulnerability Matrix data, the 
DSS is able to compute the predicted Initial Physical Harms Scenario.  
Alert state (1 day before the event): The output of B3 indicates that there are different CI 
components that will be affected by a natural event (i.e. a flooding event). In this case, the RAL 
workflow proceeds with steps B4 and B5 to communicate to the decision makers the expected 
CI damage scenario and its impacts and consequences. If the confidence level of the prediction 
is high and the impacts and consequences are significant, the DSS RAL workflow will enter in 
an alert state. Then, the RAL workflow may be triggered on an hourly basis, while the DSS will 
try to acquire detailed data as much as possible during B1 (e.g. radar now-casting data and 
satellite data acquisition) in order to increase the accuracy of the prediction. 
Hot phase: The DSS Risk Assessment Loop may be triggered also on demand during an 
emergency hot phase. For instance, on day 2 the DSS operators may start the Risk Assessment 
Loop in order to evaluate the impacts and the consequences of one or more CI component 
reduction or loss of QoS. The DSS will give as output to the emergency decision maker visual 
and textual information in order to support the planning of risk mitigation strategies.  
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper highlights the importance of a DSS for large-scale flood events. Hereby, the cross-
boundary represents a first step towards a decision support system for consequence analysis of 
flooding on CI.  
CI plays an essential role for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, 
security, economic or social well-being of people. It has been shown that natural threats such as 
large-scale floods may have significant impact on CI either directly or by means of cascading 
effects. However, due to the high complexity of and interdependencies between different CI 
domains, the effects of natural threats on CI are not yet well known. Previous events have 
shown that responsible authorities have difficulties with respect to the preparedness and 
understanding as well as response in case of CI failure.  
Thus, the main objective of the CIPRNet DSS is to analyze possible critical scenarios from 
the prediction of the initial events to the assessment of the impacts on CI networks and related 
consequences or substantial reduction of the services of CI components impacted by a threat. 
As a first step, a storyline scenario has been worked out for the Dutch-German border area. 
Within the storyline, possible cascading effects due to potential flood events on different CI 
networks have been described. On this basis, a what-if analysis will be carried out to analyze 
possible cascading effects due to selected “first” events. The what-if functionality will be used 
further used for the training of decision makers.  
In a later phase, a DSS will be implemented to support decision makers in case of natural 
threats. The DSS will be fed with data coming from external sources and CIPRNet data. The 
most important outputs of the DSS are structured reports containing risk assessment 
information and consequence analysis results.  
It is expected that CIPRNet will significantly contribute to the preparedness and 
understanding of emergency responders of the need to protect critical infrastructure. On a long 
term, the CIPRNet initiative will build a substantial and tangible basis towards the long-lasting 
European Infrastructures Simulation and Analysis Centre (EISAC).  
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